

Message Text

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ACTION AF-08

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
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FM AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5612

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MAPUTO 0305

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, MZ
SUBJECT: PARM-ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCES ASSESSMENT-PART I

REF: (A) CERP 0001; (B) STATE 47671; (C) STATE 38356;
(D) STATE 38338; (E) STATE 50086

THE EMBASSY SUBMITTED ITS POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESS-
MENT FOR MOZAMBIQUE ON OCTOBER 12, 1976 (MAPUTO A-076).
WHAT FOLLOWS IS ESSENTIALLY AN UP-DATING OF THAT RE-
PORT, WITH EMPHASIS ON POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS THAT
RELATE TO OUR REGIONAL SOUTHERN AFRICAN INTERESTS
AND OBJECTIVES AS DISCUSSED IN THE SP/P AND AF POLICY
TRENDS PAPERS (REFTELS D AND E).

PART I-POLICY ASSESSMENT

A. U.S. INTERESTS

U.S. BILATERAL INTERESTS IN MOZAMBIQUE ARE MINIMAL:
DIRECT INVESTMENT IS LESS THAN \$5 MILLION; ANNUAL U.S.
EXPORTS TO MOZAMBIQUE AVERAGE ONLY \$30-35 MILLION; WE
IMPORT NO ESSENTIAL RESOURCES FROM MOZAMBIQUE: AND THE
NON-OFFICIAL AMERICANS IN COUNTRY NUMBER LESS THAN
20.

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WE DO, HOWEVER, HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE ROLE
MOZAMBIQUE PLAYS IN THE REGION. BECAUSE OF MOZAMBIQUE'S
LOCATION AND THE COMMITMENT AND INFLUENCE OF PRESIDENT
MACHEL, MOZAMBIQUE IS CURRENTLY IN THE FOREFRONT OF
THE STRUGGLE TO OUST THE REMAINING WHITE MINORITY RE-
GIMES. BY ESPOUSING THE ARMED STRUGGLE AND THE ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF "REVOLUTIONARY" GOVERNMENTS, MOZAMBIQUE WILL

BE CONTINUOUSLY AND DEEPLY INVOLVED IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS WITH ITS WHITE NEIGHBORS--SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA--AND POSSIBLY WITH ITS MODERATE BLACK NEIGHBORS--SWAZILAND AND MALAWI. MOZAMBIQUE'S STRONG PRO-COMMUNIST AND ANTI-WESTERN BIAS ALSO POSES THE POSSIBILITY THAT MOZAMBIQUE MAY PROVIDE A SPRINGBOARD FROM WHICH THE SOVIETS, CHINESE AND CUBANS COULD EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT SOUTHERN AFRICA.

THUS, WE HAVE AN IMPORTANT REGIONAL INTEREST IN NEUTRALIZING MOZAMBIQUE'S ADVERSE INFLUENCE ON OUR EFFORTS TO:

- MINIMIZE CONFLICT AND RACIAL VIOLENCE;
- BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA;
- MINIMIZE SOVIET, CHINESE AND CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE AND IN THE AREA: SPECIFICALLY, WE HAVE A STRATEGIC INTEREST THAT THE USSR NOT BE GRANTED MILITARY FACILITIES IN MOZAMBIQUE, THAT CUBAN COMBAT TROOPS NOT INTERVENE IN THE ZIMBABWEAN LIBERATION STRUGGLE, AND THAT THE SOVIET, CHINESE AND CUBAN MILITARY ADVISORS TO THE MOZAMBIQUE MILITARY FORCES, AS WELL AS TO THE ZIMBABWEAN MILITARY FORCES, BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM; AND
- PREVENT THE SUBVERSION OF NEIGHBORING MODERATE BLACK AFRICAN REGIMES.

B. OVERVIEW

THE EMBASSY DOES NOT ANTICIPATE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE ESSENTIALLY UNFRIENDLY AND AT TIMES HOSTILE POSTURE OF THE GPRM WITH RESPECT TO THE WEST IN GENERAL

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AND THE U.S. IN PARTICULAR. IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT DURING THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO:

- THE GPRM WILL CONTINUE ITS CLOSE IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL TIES WITH THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES; AMONG OTHER THINGS WE EXPECT AN INCREASE IN COMMUNIST MILITARY ADVISORS AND ASSISTANCE AS WELL AS MORE SOVIET NAVAL SHIP VISITS.
- THE GPRM WILL CONTINUE TO ESPOUSE AND SUPPORT POLICIES INIMICAL TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTEREST. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO US, WE EXPECT THAT THE GPRM WILL TRY TO MARSHAL INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR REMOVAL OF WESTERN MILITARY BASES FROM THE INDIAN OCEAN.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 MAPUTO 0305

--THE GPRM WILL PERSIST IN ITS EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH
A MARXIST-LENINIST STATE IN MOZAMBIQUE: CONTINUING
ECONOMIC DETERIORATION WILL REINFORCE THE GPRM'S
PARANOIA OF "REACTIONARIES AND IMPERIALISTS" AND LEAD
TO EVEN MORE RADICAL AUTHORITARIAN POLICIES UNDER THE
RUBRIC OF MARXISM-LENINISM.

--THE GPRM WILL BE HESITANT ABOUT ENGAGING IN
DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN MATTERS-
OR TO BE SEEN TO BE DOING SO--ALTHOUGH MACHEL MAY
BE LESS DISTANT WITH THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION THAN HE
WAS WITH THE FORD ADMINISTRATION.

AT THIS READING, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER MACHEL
WOULD COOPERATE WITH FURTHER U.S. AND UK ATTEMPTS TO
NEGOTIATE A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE IN
RHODESIA.

THIS PAST YEAR, OUT OF DEFERENCE TO PRESIDENTS
NYERERE AND KAUNDA, MACHEL AGREED TO GIVE NEGOTIATIONS A
CHANCE, PROVIDED THERE WAS NO LET-UP IN THE FIGHTING
AND PROVIDED THE ZIPA CADRE WERE GIVEN A VOICE IN THE
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. FROM THE OUTSET, HOWEVER, MACHEL
DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SMITH WOULD VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISH
CONTROL OF RHODESIA TO BLACK NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT,
AND HE QUESTIONED THE MOTIVES OF BOTH THE U.S. AND THE
UK IN SEEKING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.
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MACHEL'S PATIENCE WITH NEGOTIATIONS APPEARS TO BE
WEARING THIN. THE WAGING OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST
RHODESIA HAS HURT MOZAMBIQUE MORE THAN ANY OTHER FRONT
LINE STATE. HIS ECONOMY, ALREADY IN SERIOUS STRAITS
BECAUSE OF THE EXODUS OF THE PORTUGUESE, WAS DAMAGED
EVEN FURTHER BY THE CLOSING OF THE BORDER WITH RHODESIA.

REPEATED RHODESIAN RAIDS INTO MOZAMBIQUE--AND AN INABILITY TO DO MUCH ABOUT THEM--HAS PROVIDED EMBARRASSING AND DAMAGING. MACHEL HAS ALREADY SOUGHT MORE SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO DEFEND HIS BORDERS.

THERE IS ALSO EVIDENCE THAT MACHEL HAS CONSIDERED REQUESTING CUBAN COMBAT FORCES TO HELP DEFEND HIS BORDERS AGAINST RHODESIAN INCURSIONS. FOR THE MOMENT, IT APPEARS THAT NYERERE AND KAUNDA HAVE DISSUADED HIM FROM DOING SO, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE HE WILL PRESS FOR CUBAN AND/OR OTHER FOREIGN INTERVENTION IF:

--RHODESIAN RAIDS INTO MOZAMBIQUE PERSIST AND CAN NOT BE HALTED;

--SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD STEP-UP ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE SMITH REGIME;

--MERCENARIES ARE RECRUITED INTO THE RHODESIAN ARMY IN EVER GREATER NUMBERS; OR

--ZIPA INSURGENTS FALTER IN THEIR EFFORTS TO MAKE SERIOUS INROADS AGAINST THE RHODESIANS.

C. OBJECTIVES/COURSE OF ACTION/ISSUES

1. OBJECTIVES

--ENCOURAGE MACHEL AND GPRM TO WORK WITH THE OTHER FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS IN SUPPORT OF EFFORTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL WAY TO BRING MAJORITY RULE TO ZIMBABWE: AT A MINIMUM, DISCOURAGE MACHEL AND GPRM FROM WORKING OPENLY AND ACTIVELY AGAINST OUR EFFORTS.

--MAKE THE GPRM AWARE OF THE DANGERS AND CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD FOLLOW FROM GREATER COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN AFFAIRS: ENCOURAGE AND SUSTAIN THE EXISTING TENDENCY WITHIN THE GPRM NOT TO GRANT BASE
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RIGHTS TO OUTSIDE POWERS.

--ERODE THE POLITICAL MYTHOLOGY PREVALENT IN MOZAMBIQUE THAT IT IS IN MOZAMBIQUE'S INTEREST TO KEEP ITS DISTANCE FROM THE US; GAIN ACCEPTANCE FOR THE NOTION THAT THERE ARE AREAS WHERE IT IS IN THE MUTUAL INTERESTS OF MOZAMBIQUE AND THE U.S. TO COOPERATE, INCLUDING THE PARTICIPATION OF U.S. COMPANIES ON AN EQUITABLE AND FAIR BASIS IN THE EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE'S MINERAL AND AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES.

--MAINTAIN A DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE AND POSTURE IN MOZAMBIQUE THAT WILL BE VIEWED BY BLACK AFRICAN LEADERS AS EVIDENCE OF USG SUPPORT FOR MAJORITY RULE THROUGHOUT AFRICA: DEMONSTRATE USG INTEREST IN THE LIBERATION GROUPS BASED IN MOZAMBIQUE.

--ENCOURAGE THE GPRM TO ADOPT A MORE "EVEN-HANDED" APPROACH ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES WHICH AFFECT US, E.G. BIG POWER NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 MAPUTO 0305

2. COURSES OF ACTION

--BE RECEPTIVE TO INDICATIONS FROM MACHEL THAT HE
WOULD WELCOME TALKS WITH THE USG ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN
MATTERS: LOOK FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO ENGAGE HIM IN SUCH
A DIALOGUE IF HE DOES NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE.
--CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE WHEN REQUESTED TO UNHCR
AND WFP PROGRAMS TO ASSIST SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGUGEES IN
MOZAMBIQUE. (SUCH PROGRAMS ARE LOW-COST AND HIGHLY
VISIBLE AND DEMONSTRATE USG COMMITMENT TO MAJORITY
RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.)
--CONTINUE TO RESPOND TO GPRM REQUEST FOR HU-
MANITARIAN, FOOD OR EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE SO AS TO DEMON-
STRATE CONTINUED U.S. INTEREST IN DEVELOPING BETTER
RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT.
--SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO PRESENT USG POSITIONS ON
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES: PROBE THE POSSIBILITY OF
RE-ESTABLISHING A SELECTIVE USIS PROGRAM.
--DEVELOP AND EXPAND CONTACTS WITH MEMBER OF LIBER-
ATION GROUPS BASED IN MOZAMBIQUE; MONITOR AND ASSESS
THE EXTENT OF THEIR LINKS WITH SOVIETS, CHINESE AND
CUBANS.
--CONTINUE TO FACILITATE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE
GPRM AND PRIVATE AMERICAN FIRMS. (RECENT GPRM DEALINGS
WITH THE EMBASSY AND PRIVATE U.S. FIRMS SUGGESTS THAT
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THE GOVERNMENT HAS FEWER RESERVATIONS THAN MIGHT BE EXPECTED ABOUT DEALING WITH U.S. FIRMS. THIS PRAGMATIC DEVELOPMENT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGEDD.)

3. ISSUES

TWO ISSUES ARISE WITH RESPECT TO HOW WE DEAL WITH MACHEL.

FIRST, SHOULD WE SUSTAIN OUR EFFORTS TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH HIM ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN MATTERS? MACHEL HAS NOT BEEN AS RECEPTIVE TO DIALOGUE AS WE WOULD LIKE, BUT THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT HE MAY BE MORE READY NOW THAN BEFORE TO ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD MAKE THE EFFORT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT HE IS LESS LIKELY TO WORK OPENLY AGAINST OUR INITIATIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA IF HE IS TALKING TO US THAN IF WE EXCLUDE HIM FROM OUR CONSULTATIONS. THE OTHER FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS ALSO HAVE BEEN URGING US TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH MACHEL.

SECOND, SHOULD WE OFFER BILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE IN FY 1978? OWING TO MACHEL'S STRONG PRO-COMMUNIST AND ANTI-WESTERN POLICIES, AID TO MOZAMBIQUE HAS BECOME A SENSITIVE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE. AS A RESULT OF CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION TO OUR \$12.5 MILLION AID OFFER TO MOZAMBIQUE THIS PAST SUMMER, THE FY 1977 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT CONTAINS NO FUNDS FOR BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR MOZAMBIQUE. WHETHER PL480 TITLE I OR II FOOD AID WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR MOZAMBIQUE IS STILL OPEN. WE DO NOT BELIEVE FURTHER OFFERS OF AID ARE GOING TO RESULT IN ANY CHANGE IN MOZAMBIQUE'S FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC POLICIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE BELIEVE THAT A MODEST HUMANITARIAN AID PROGRAM IS A GOOD WAY OF DEMONSTRATING U.S. INTEREST IN MAJORITY RULE AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND ENHANCES THE CHANCES OF OBTAINING THE COOPERATION OF OTHER AFRICANS IN OUR EFFORTS TO REACH A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS IN THE

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AREA. MOREOVER, A FRELIMO GOVERNMENT--AND OTHERS LIKE IT--ARE NOT ABOUT TO DISAPPEAR, AND WE BELIEVE IT IN OUR INTEREST TO FIND SOME WAY OF RELATING TO THEM IN ORDER TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN THE AREA. A MODEST BEGINNING HAS BEEN MADE WITH THE MACHEL GOVERNMENT. A SMALL FOOD AID PROGRAM, JUSTIFIABLE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS ALONE, WOULD HELP US KEEP OUR OPTIONS OPEN.

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